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1. Introduction 
Many epistemologists believe that there are important connections between epistemic 
reasons, epistemic justification, and evidence.1  Justification and strong evidential 
support are supposed to go hand in hand. 2 The reasons that matter to justification and 
knowledge are all taken to be pieces of evidence.  According to this way of thinking, 
reasons and evidence play a grounding role. Reasons and only reasons settle whether 
there is justification to believe what we do. (Or, if you prefer, evidence and only 
evidence settles whether there is justification to believe what we do.)  When the right 
support is present, there is justification for our beliefs. When we believe for the right 
reasons and we're sensitive to their rational force, our beliefs are justifiably held. When 
this support is absent, nothing could justify our beliefs.  
 The standard view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about evidence. 
It is also mistaken about reasons. The standard view is comprised of four claims that 
capture the idea that possessed reasons or evidence grounds justification:  
The Sufficiency Thesis: If your evidence provides strong 
enough support for p, you have justification to believe p 
because of this evidential support.    
The Dependence Thesis: If you have justification to 
believe p, this is because your evidence provides strong 
enough support for p.3 
The Identity Thesis: The reasons that determine whether 
you have justification to believe p just are pieces of 
evidence that you have in your possession.   
The Foundedness Thesis: You justifiably believe p iff you 
believe p, your reasons for believing p are pieces of 
evidence that provide strong enough support for this 
belief, and you are properly sensitive to this.  
Sufficiency and Dependence tell us that strong evidential support is present whenever 
propositional justification is present and that the presence of propositional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I want to thank Maria Alvarez, Robert Audi, Oliver Black, Charles Cote-Bouchard, 
Christina Dietz, Trent Dougherty, Julien Dutant, Craig French, Matthew Frise, Scott 
Hagaman, John Hawthorne, Frank Hofmann, Jen Hornsby, Nick Hughes, Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio, Dustin Locke, Errol Lord, Matt McGrath, Veli Mitova, Duncan 
Pritchard, Declan Smithies, Kurt Sylvan, and Tim Williamson for discussing these 
issues with me.  
2 Conee and Feldman (2004, 2008) assume that there are such connections. So does 
McDowell (1998). Their positive picture of justification and its relation to knowledge 
differ radically, but their disagreements are predicated on a set of shared assumptions 
about these relations.  Perhaps the most sophisticated discussion of the standard view 
is found in Sosa and Sylvan (forthcoming).    
3 It is surprisingly difficult to find explicit arguments for the claim that justification 
requires supporting evidence. I will present an argument from McDowell later. 
Interested readers might also consult Lord (2013). 
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justification is always due to the presence of strong evidential support. Identity tells us 
that the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe will always be 
pieces of evidence. Foundedness tells us something about the relationship between 
propositional and doxastic justification.  Because of space constraints, the discussion 
will be concerned with the first three theses. Once we see why they're mistaken, we 
don't need a further argument against Foundedness. 
 The paper will proceed as follows. After a brief discussion of the ontology of 
reasons, I shall offer arguments against Sufficiency and Dependence. Once we see why 
they are mistaken, we will see why it is crucial to distinguish evidence from reasons. 
And once we do that, we can see that evidence and reasons have to play different roles 
in our normative theories.    
 
2. Preliminary Questions about Reasons 
The standard view is a view about the rational role of reasons and evidence.  It tells us 
what they do (i.e., determine what’s justified) and where they must be when something 
gets done (i.e., wherever something is justified), but it doesn't answer some important 
questions about reasons and evidence.4 It tells us nothing about the ontology of 
reasons. It tells us nothing about their possession. 
 In this paper, I assume that reasons of all kinds are facts or true propositions. 
Normative reasons, motivating reasons, and explanatory reasons differ because they 
play different explanatory roles, not because they belong to different ontological 
categories or because only some of them have to be true to be reasons.5  We can modify 
the statement of the standard view to capture this:  
You have justification to believe p iff you have evidence 
that consists of facts that provides sufficiently strong 
support for believing p. 
You justifiably believe p only if you believe p for reasons 
where your reasons for believing p consists of facts that 
provide sufficiently strong support for believing p.  
Once we modify the view we need to decide on a view of possession. We know that 
your evidence box contains facts and nothing but facts, but we don't know how you 
have to be related to these facts for these facts to be included in your box of evidence. 
We will return to this below.   
 Some philosophers still reject this view about the ontology of reasons. They 
typically do so because they think that this gives us the wrong account of motivating 
reasons (i.e., a subject's reasons). They might concede that good reasons or normative 
reasons consist of facts. They might also concede that explanatory reasons consist of 
facts.  Nevertheless, they insist that motivating reasons are different. Some will say that 
a subject's reasons for φ-ing will consist of the subject's mental states.6 Others say that 
they consist of the propositions that these subjects have in mind when they're in such 
states.7   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Proponents of the view presumably do not think that just strong evidential support is 
sufficient for justification. Only sufficiently strong evidence will do. Let's not worry too 
much about what sufficiency is.   
5 See Alvarez (2010). 
6 See Conee and Feldman (2008), Gibbons (2013), McCain (2014), and Turri (2009).   
7 See Comesana and McGrath (2014), Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Schroeder (2008). 
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 There are simple and straightforward arguments for the view that all reasons 
have to be truths.8  The trouble with statism, as Dancy observed, is that it implies that 
it's impossible to V for a good reason.9 The good reasons to V are all facts or true 
propositions. Thus, if the reason for which you V is in some other ontological category 
(state of mind, event, substance, trope, etc.) then it could not be a good reason to V. The 
trouble with propositionalism is that the propositionalist wants to say that falsehoods 
can be motivating reasons. They seem to acknowledge that explanatory reasons cannot 
be falsehoods. Because of this, it's hard to see how their proposal about motivating 
reasons could be right. The sentences that we use to ascribe motivating reasons entail 
corresponding sentences that we use to ascribe explanatory reasons.10  If Agnes' reason 
for heading to the bar is that we're out of beer, the reason why she heads to the bar is 
that we're out of beer.  Since the reason why a subject V's can only be p if p is true, the 
subject's reason for V-ing can only be p if p is true. To my knowledge, not a single 
proponent of propositionalism has addressed this very simple argument.11 Moreover, it 
doesn't make good philosophical sense to deny this entailment. If you were to deny it, 
you would offer an account of motivating reasons according to which the truth about a 
subject's motivating reasons would not explain why she did what she did, thought what 
she thought, or felt what she felt. Your account of motivating reasons wouldn't be an 
account of anything at all. Because the propositionalists haven't addressed this 
argument, I don’t have anything else to say about their view.12   
 The distinction between motivating and normative reasons is widely 
recognized but there's been less discussion of the distinction between motivating and 
explanatory reasons. As I've just said, all motivating reasons are explanatory reasons 
but explanatory reasons needn't be motivating (e.g., the fact that I’m bored might 
explain why I’m doodling without being my reason for doodling; the fact that I’m shy 
might explain why I’m staying home but it wouldn’t be my reason for staying home; 
the fact that I’m gullible might explain why I believe things I read on the internet, but 
it wouldn’t be my reason for believing what I read on the internet). Reasons of both 
kinds explain the agent's actions or attitudes, but motivating reasons do so in a 
distinctive way.  They are supposed to capture the light in which the agent saw things 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Littlejohn (2012) for a discussion of the ontology of reasons. 
9 See Dancy (1999). 
10 A point stressed in Littlejohn (2012).   
11 When philosophers say that they will address the linguistic evidence for factualism, 
they tend not to address the linguistic evidence that ascriptions of motivating reasons 
entail correlative ascriptions or explanatory reasons (a crucial motivation for 
factualism in Littlejohn (2012) and tend not to address the evidence that ascriptions of 
motivating reasons entail correlative ascriptions of propositional knowledge (a crucial 
motivation for factualism in Unger (1975).  See, for example, the discussions of 
Comesana and McGrath (2014) and Fantl (2015).   
12 I should say one thing about the motivation for the propositionalist view. My 
impression is that the view seems attractive because it seems that such a view is 
required to vindicate certain intuitions about cases while adhering to the standard 
view. If, as I shall argue, the standard view is mistaken, this should help to relieve some 
of the pressure that pushes people to adopt the propositionalist view. 
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and highlight the features of the agent's actions or attitudes that the agent took to make 
the actions or attitudes right, appropriate, or fitting.13 
 Because of this, there are three important features of motivating reasons worth 
highlighting.  First, there are access requirements on motivating reasons that don't 
apply to the other kinds of reasons. You can overlook a normative reason if, say, you 
are attending to the wrong things or are forgetful. You cannot overlook your reasons 
for V-ing if they truly were your reasons for V-ing. You can also overlook an 
explanatory reason even if it is a reason that explains your actions. One reason why 
you might believe you have hands is that it looks to you that you do. One reason why 
you might believe that you have hands is that you are a BIV being manipulated in a 
certain way. If this fact is a fact, it doesn't capture your perspective on things, so it 
wouldn't be your reason for believing that you have hands. 
 Second, facts about motivating reasons reveal things about your values.  If your 
reason for V-ing is that V-ing has such and such a feature (e.g., it settles a score, it is 
required by fairness, etc.), this reveals that this feature is on your list of pros. Similarly, 
if you believe p on the say so of another, it reveals something about your take on their 
reliability.  Because normative reasons and explanatory reasons don't have access 
requirements, they can figure in explanations without providing much insight into 
your values or what you valued at the time (i.e., the kinds of costs you were willing to 
incur and the kinds of things that you see as worth pursuing, as making a kind of 
response fitting or appropriate, etc.).  The fact that you are shy might explain why you 
stayed home, but it probably wouldn't be your reason for staying home. You probably 
didn't see the fact that you were shy as a pro that counted in favor of staying away. 
Because you are shy, you probably saw the presence of strangers as a reason to stay 
away.  
 Third, the possession of these reasons must be independent from the actions or 
attitudes that these reasons might then explain.  If your reason for V-ing is that p, it 
must be that your possession of p as a reason is constitutively independent from 
whether you V. Having V'd, in other words, couldn't be among the conditions that 
must be met for p to be one of your reasons. This independence constraint is required 
so that p could be a potential basis for V-ing.  If you are convinced to V or convinced 
that q where your reason for V-ing or believing that q is that p, the possession of this 
reason could not require V-ing or believing q. The possessed reason could not then 
explain the action or attitude.  It couldn't if possession of it is both necessary for it to 
explain things and the possession of it turns on whether the thing it explains occurred 
or obtained.   
 So that we can refer back to these constraints, let’s call these the access, favoring, 
and independence constraints. Because of these constraints, it's possible for there to be 
cases in which someone φ's where there's nothing that's the subject's reason for V-ing 
where there are nevertheless normative reasons that speak in favor or against V-ing as 
well as explanatory reasons that explain why you φ'd.  Even when nothing satisfies the 
two constraints just mentioned there might be reasons why a subject V'd and there 
might also be good reasons for them to φ or refrain from V-ing. My favorite example is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Since McDowell (1978) this has been the standard gloss on the notion. 
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doodling.14 You might doodle and do so intentionally even though there's nothing that 
would be your reason for doing so. There might be reasons for you to stop (e.g., it is 
distracting, you are using up the last of the ink) and there might be reasons why you're 
doing it (e.g., you are bored) even if there's nothing that's your reason for doodling. 
 How does this relate to evidence?  According to the standard view, your belief 
in p could only be justified if (a) you believe p for some reasons and (b) your reasons for 
believing p are sufficiently good for so believing.  The issue, then, isn't whether you 
could have justified beliefs without there being any normative or explanatory reasons, 
but whether your belief could be justified even when you believe p without believing p 
for sufficiently good reasons (i.e., cases in which there's nothing that is your reason for 
believing p or cases in which the reason that is your reason for believing p is not a good 
one for believing p). I take it that your evidence for believing p should be understood in 
terms of motivating reasons (i.e., your reasons for believing p), not (mere) explanatory 
reasons and not (necessarily) normative reasons. Your reasons for believing p could be 
bad reasons for believing that, so satisfying the basing condition doesn't require that 
you've hit upon good reasons to believe what you do. Explanatory reasons might not 
be your reasons, so the presence of such reasons won't tell us what your evidence is. If, 
say, you are deceived by a demon and believe that you have hands, one reason why 
you believe you have hands is that you're deceived by a demon. That wouldn't be your 
reason for believing that you have hands, though, because (a) you wouldn't be aware of 
your deception and (b) you wouldn't take the fact that you were deceived to be any sort 
of indication that you have hands.  In the next section, I shall argue that it's possible to 
justifiably believe things without believing things for good reasons.  Once this 
argument is in place, the argument against the standard view will be straightforward.         
 
3. The Basis Problems 
The most promising way of developing the standard view draws on work done by 
McDowell and Pritchard. 15   They think that reasons consist of facts or true 
propositions. They also offer us some helpful guidance in understanding what it takes 
for rational support to be sufficient to justify belief. On their view of perceptual 
knowledge, the standard cases of perceptual knowledge of the truth of p are cases in 
which your reason for believing p will be that you see that p. On McDowell’s view of 
justified perceptual belief, it’s not possible for our perceptual beliefs to be justified if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Heuer (2014).  The strongest argument against the idea that acting on false belief 
is a case of acting intentionally without acting for a reason is that it's not possible to act 
intentionally unless you act for a reason. The argument fails because there are cases of 
acting intentionally without acting for a reason. Heuer's case of doodling is one, but 
further examples include actions that express emotions and actions in which the agent 
acts from a mistaken belief.    
15 McDowell's view has evolved in many ways since he published the papers in his 
(1998), but the core idea about the kind of support we need for justified belief has 
remained constant.  Pritchard (2012) focuses primarily on perceptual knowledge and 
the kind of rational support required for it. He might think that this sort of support is 
not required for justified belief, but he defends a view that clashes with more familiar 
internalist views insofar as he thinks that a certain kind of reflectively accessible factive 
support is available in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge. Most internalists 
think that it is never possible to have beliefs that receive this kind of support. 
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they don’t constitute knowledge, so the account of justification just falls out of his 
account of knowledge.16 I don’t know whether Pritchard agrees with McDowell on this 
point, but let's suppose for the time being that they do.   
 On this non-standard version of the standard view it is only possible to have 
perceptual knowledge and justified perceptual belief when you believe for reasons that 
are better than the reasons you could have in your evidence box in cases of systematic 
deception.  You might wonder why we should think such high-grade reasons are 
required for justification or for knowledge. McDowell and Pritchard seem to be 
motivated by different concerns. McDowell’s demand seems to be based on two ideas 
about knowledge and justification.  First, he thinks that it’s important to capture a 
certain kind of internalist insight:  
The root idea is that one’s epistemic standing … cannot 
intelligibly be constituted, even in part, by matters 
blankly external to how it is with one subjectively. For 
how could such matters be other than beyond one’s ken? 
And how could matters beyond one’s ken make any 
difference to one’s epistemic standing (1998: 390)? 
If your reasons were the same as the reasons you’d have if you were systematically 
deceived, your reasons couldn’t confer upon you the kind of epistemic benefit that 
McDowell thinks is required for knowledge. The crucial factors that distinguished 
knowing p from being ignorant about whether p would be beyond your ken and it's 
hard to see how such factors operating outside your view could be the crucial factor in 
giving you the epistemic benefits enjoyed by people 'in the know'.  Second, he seems to 
think of knowledge as the standard against which we evaluate beliefs. If any belief fails 
to meet that standard, that belief might be excusably held, but by virtue of failing to 
meet that standard, it is one that shouldn’t be held. If you think that you cannot 
justifiably believe p when you shouldn’t believe p, you could see why someone like 
McDowell who sees knowledge as the norm of belief would think that justification and 
knowledge would be linked in this way. 
 Pritchard’s motivation seems to be different. McDowell seems to be focused on 
the preconditions that have to be met for you to be properly positioned to come to 
know something.  On McDowell's way of thinking of things, these conditions do not 
involve knowledge because they are the conditions that explain how it could be 
possible to come to know in the first place.  Pritchard is also concerned with the upshot 
of having knowledge of some target proposition.  If you know p, say, and know that q is 
true if p is, you should be able to rule out hypotheses in which q would be false.  It’s 
hard to see how you could knowingly do this if you didn’t have evidence that ‘favored’ 
q over its negation, but it’s also difficult to see how you could meet this favoring 
condition if, say, you’d have the same evidence as an internal duplicate deceived about 
p and q.17 Thus, it seems that it should only be possible to have the kinds of evidence 
you’d have if you knew p and had the abilities that came with that knowledge (e.g., the 
ability to knowingly rule out certain hypotheses) if you had better evidence than the 
deceived could have. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See McDowell (2002: 280). 
17 See Pritchard (2012: 77). It is an interesting question whether the favoring condition 
can be spelled out in such a way that it avoids worries discussed in Brueckner (2005). 
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 You might take exception with these claims about what's involved in sufficient 
evidential support, but we should at least acknowledge that when these authors 
develop the standard view their claim that sufficient evidence justifies belief isn’t 
empty. (Compare the present suggestion to the suggestion that sufficient evidence is 
the evidence that justifies belief.)  It does, however, put them under pressure to tell us 
how we acquire the evidence that makes non-inferential knowledge possible and to tell 
us what this evidence is.  McDowell and Pritchard seem to think that perception makes 
this evidence available. Once available the things we see can serve as our reasons for 
our perceptual beliefs. Because of the quality of these reasons, our perceptual beliefs 
can constitute knowledge.  Once you see, say, that there is an owl sitting on the branch 
outside of your window, you can believe that there is an owl there for the reason that 
you see that there is. The seeing is the contribution of perception, something that 
makes the reason available. It seems that the relevant reason satisfies the access, 
favoring, and independence constraint. If you have access to what you see and your 
seeing of it, the purported reason is accessible. If you think that the fact that you see 
that p settles the question whether p affirmatively, the purported reason seems to 
favor. If you think that seeing does not constitutively involve belief, you might think of 
perception as a way of acquiring reasons that you can then use to settle questions and 
therein come to believe or know something.  
 
3.1 The Primary Basis Problem 
The proposal on the table faces a potentially serious objection.  It seems that the 
proposal satisfies the access, favoring, and independence constraints because it might 
seem that perception can provide a reason that could be a good basis for knowledge. 
Unfortunately, the fact that McDowell and Pritchard identify as the rational basis for 
believing p is the fact that you see that p.18 Arguably, seeing that p is really just a matter 
of knowing that p in a particular way.19 Contrary to what they seem to suggest, seeing 
that something is so is not a purely visual matter; rather, it is a partially epistemic 
matter, one that involves belief and knowledge as constituents. You cannot claim that 
the foundational reason that serves as the basis for believing p is the fact that you see 
that p is seeing that p is, inter alia, knowing and believing p. The possession of such a 
reason cannot explain how you came to believe p or what convinced you that p, for it is 
only in the state of conviction or belief that you see that p. 
 Pritchard calls this the basis problem. I'll call this the primary basis problem. 
Briefly stated, this problem is the problem of specifying the rational basis for the 
perceptual belief in a way that meets the constraints set out above about the possession 
of reasons and the kinds of support that these reasons would have to provide to justify 
belief.  As he conceives of it, the problem arises because the rational basis has to be a 
possessed reason or piece of evidence and the candidate he identifies is the fact that 
you see that p. The problem with this basis is that it seems that seeing that p is nothing 
but knowing that p in a particular way. Thus, while possessed reasons that do justify 
belief are supposed to explain how you could be in a good position to know p, this fact 
cannot explain how you could be in a good position to know p because it just is the fact 
that you know p.  This problem is much more general than Pritchard suggests. We all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See McDowell (1998) and Pritchard (2012). 
19 See Dretske (1969), French (2012), and Ranalli (2014) for helpful discussions of the 
relationship between propositional seeing, vision, and knowledge. 
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face a similar problem, the problem of explaining how we could possess some 
evidence or reason that puts us in good standing without invoking this very standing to 
explain the possession of the evidence or reason. 
 Pritchard proposes a solution, which is to reject the following thesis:  
The Entailment Thesis: seeing that p involves knowing that p in 
a visual way.  
Pritchard and McDowell reject the Entailment Thesis because they think that you can 
see that p without believing that p is the case (2012: 26).  If this were so, it would seem 
that the purported rational basis for believing p would indeed satisfy the three 
constraints mentioned above. As an added bonus, if anyone who sees that p is in a good 
position to know that p, the identified reason really would give us the kind of rational 
support required by any version of the standard view that recognizes knowledge as the 
norm of belief. 
 This isn’t the only strategy for trying to solve this problem. Rather than target 
the Entailment Thesis, one might modify McDowell and Pritchard’s proposal. Instead 
of saying that your reason for believing that there is an owl on the branch is a fact 
about facts being seen, you might instead propose that the fact made visually manifest 
is your reason for believing p.20  In the case of non-inferential perceptual knowledge of 
p, your reason for believing p is simply that p (Littlejohn 2012: 125 and Schnee 
forthcoming). If we treat the seeing as the means of acquiring the reason, which we 
identify with the fact that p, we avoid the problem that we need to posit knowledge to 
account for the possibility of acquiring knowledge. 
 Unfortunately, neither strategy works. The trouble with rejecting the 
Entailment Thesis is that it is true. The trouble with modifying McDowell and 
Pritchard’s proposal and characterizing our basis for believing p as the fact that we see 
(i.e., the fact that p) is that it seems to treat facts as among the things we see.21  Even if 
these worries are misplaced, these proposals suffer from a common defect, one that 
suggests that the primary basis problem is really a problem for the standard view and 
not just the way that these authors have tried to develop it. The problem has to do with 
the kind of relation we have to bear to a reason for it to be the reason in light of which 
we believe, feel, or do something. 
 Let’s suppose for the sake of discussion that experience is like belief in having a 
kind of representational content. If you like this way of thinking about experience, you 
might think that one of the main epistemically significant differences between belief 
and experience is that when you believe p, you are committed to the truth of p in such a 
way that you would be mistaken if p were false. The same doesn’t hold for experience. 
It might seem to Lady MacBeth that there is a spot on her hand because of the kind of 
visual experiences she’s having, but if she suspects that she is hallucinating again she 
wouldn’t be right about her hand if there was a spot there and she wouldn’t be wrong 
about her hand if there was no spot there. An experience might ‘invite’ you to believe, 
but it doesn’t compel or involve belief.  Because of this difference, I don’t think that 
you could acquire p as evidence by means of an experience that was not accompanied 
by a further belief that p is true. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This view is sometimes ascribed to McDowell, but not by McDowell. See his (2006). 
21 For arguments against the idea that facts are among the things we view or perceive, 
see Brewer (2011) and Travis (2013). 
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 To possess a reason or piece of evidence, you have to be in a state where you 
could believe, feel, or do something for the reason that p without first having to change 
your attitude towards p. If your ‘attitude’ towards p consists of experience but not 
belief, you do not take it that p is true. You aren’t so minded that you’d be right about p 
if p and wrong about p if p were false.  What would it be to believe, feel, or do 
something for the reason that p?  McDowell (1978) gives us an answer.  Your reasons for 
V-ing are, as he puts it, the light in which you took there to be something good, 
favorable, appropriate, or sensible about V-ing.  If you don’t believe p, whether it’s 
because you’re agnostic about whether p or because you believe ~p, p couldn’t be your 
answer to the question, ‘What’s good about V-ing?’ As such, it couldn’t be the light in 
which you V. As such, it couldn’t be your reason for anything at all. 
 If we’re working with the standard account of motivating reasons that we get 
from McDowell, the argument just sketched shows that the possession of reasons 
requires belief in the proposition that constitutes the reason:  
Doxastic Requirement: You cannot V for the reason that p 
unless you believe p. 
With this requirement in place, we can show that the primary basis problem is actually 
a problem for the standard view in all its forms.22  The standard view has to incorporate 
the Doxastic Requirement, but this gives rise to a regress problem:   
The Regress Argument  
1. To know p or justifiably believe p, you have to have a reason 
to believe p where this reason is your reason for believing p, a 
reason that’s provided by a representational state of mind 
that’s independent from the belief that p. 
2. This representational state either has p as its content or 
something distinct from p, p'. 
3. If the former, the state would (under suitable conditions) 
enable the subject to believe things such as p for the reason 
that p. 
4. The subject’s reason for believing p cannot be p. 
5. Thus, if there is a representational state that provides you 
with a reason that enables you to know p perceptually, it must 
have a content that’s distinct from p. 
6. Suppose that the representational state’s content is some 
distinct content, p’ and that (under suitable conditions), this 
representational state would enable the subject to believe 
things for the reason that p’. 
7. To know p perceptually as a result of believing p for the 
reason that p’, you have to believe p’. 
8. To know p’, you have to have a reason to believe p’ where 
this reason is your reason for believing p’, a reason that’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Few proponents of the standard view will not recognize this problem as a problem 
for their view. They might think that false propositions or states of mind can be 
reasons we possess simply by being in certain mental states or having propositional 
attitudes. I don't think that you solve the problem by adopting a false view about the 
ontology of reasons.  
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provided by a representational state of mind that’s 
independent from the belief that p’. 
Once we get to (8), we have the start of a vicious regress. The argument makes knowing 
p conditional on knowing p' on the basis of p'' and it is clear that p'' has to be distinct 
from both p and p'.23  Proponents of the standard view did not see that such a regress 
would arise because they mistakenly thought that there were presentational states of 
mind distinct from belief that would enable you to believe, feel, or do things for the 
reason that is the content of that state of mind. Once the doxastic requirement is in 
place, though, we can see why (4) and (7) must be true.  It seemed that experience or 
seeing could help you believe things for reasons that consist of facts, but this overlooks 
the fact that the commitment that is distinctive of belief is an essential part of taking 
something to favor an option.  Without the doxastic requirement, we lose the favoring 
constraint on motivating reasons. With that in place, the independence constraint 
rules out (4) and thus creates the need for further reasons to believe p. The need cannot 
be met, however, so a vicious regress ensues. 
 There is a simple solution to the primary basis problem. We should reject the 
idea that non-inferential beliefs constitute knowledge by virtue of being supported by 
reasons.24  If the proponents of the standard view want to meet this worry, they’ll need 
to do two things. First, they’ll need to show that there’s something wrong with the 
argument for the Doxastic Requirement. Unfortunately, we have just seen that there is 
a simple but overlooked argument for the Doxastic Requirement from the standard 
gloss on what motivating reasons are. Second, they’ll need to offer some account of the 
possession of evidence on which it’s possible to possess p as a piece of evidence or as a 
potential motivating reason on which it’s possible to possess it and be rationally guided 
by it in believing, feeling, or doing things where the guidance does not require the 
belief that p is true.   
  It’s not just perceptual belief that’s a problem for the standard view, mind you. 
Once we see the motivation for the Doxastic Requirement, we can see that all cases of 
non-inferential belief cause trouble for the standard view.  The standard view tells us 
that if you justifiably believe p, there's some evidence that supports this belief and this 
evidence serves as your reason for believing what you do. This evidence either consists 
of some representational state of mind or is provided by some representational state of 
mind that has some p-related content. In the case of the belief that there's some pink 
patch before me (a patch on the back of my hand, say), there are three players to 
consider: 
(a) The belief that there's a pink patch before me; 
(b) The representational state that has an appropriate 
content related to the content of this belief (which either is 
the evidence or provides the content as evidence and makes 
true claims like 'It seems to me that there is a pink patch 
before me). 
(c) The hand, its color, its relation to me, etc. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It is clear to people who see foundationalism as the best response to the traditional 
regress problem. 
24 See Echeverri (2013), McGinn (2012), and Millar (2011) for arguments that perceptual 
belief might not be a case in which you form a belief for a reason. 
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My claim is that the second player is neither a piece of evidence nor something that 
provides evidence that would be in your possession in the absence of a belief, but the 
standard view tells us that we have to think of the items in (b) as our reasons or our 
evidence.  If there really is an irresistible pressure to apply this to the case of 
perception because of some general point about justification and the rational role of 
reasons and/or evidence, what should we say about cases of self-knowledge?   
 Let's suppose we apply this picture to the case of knowledge of our own pains.25 
You believe that you're in pain. You feel the throbbing pain in your heel. What plays 
the role of evidence here? I can't think of a representational state that's suitable. I can’t 
see how to get the three players on the stage to apply the model that the standard view 
tells us is compulsory for all cases of knowledge or justified belief. The evidence is not 
the belief. It's not the belief because there's supposed to be something independent 
from the belief that provides the evidence. It's not the pain because even if you thought 
that pain represented something, the pain belongs in (c) in this case, not (b). Moreover, 
I don't think anybody thinks that there's some representation that represents some 
sensation as being a pain that's a representation that's distinct from belief.  (Remember 
that a sensation is a pain only when it is sufficiently intense. There will be a range of 
levels of intensity here and the possibility of getting things wrong when you judge that 
a sensation is painful when it isn’t sufficiently intense. If the relevant sensation weren't 
quite intense enough to be a pain, we wouldn't say that some subject suffered from a 
kind of illusion where some representational state that we've never named presents the 
sensation as having properties it doesn't in the way that, say, experience is said to 
present external objects as having properties it doesn't when we're looking at the 
Muller-Lyer lines.)  So, is the knowledge that you are in pain a case of belief in which 
the belief is rational but isn't based on anything that we'd call evidence for the 
proposition that you're in pain? It looks that way.  
 The easiest way to solve the primary basis problem is to dissolve it. The 
problem only arises on the mistaken assumption that every case of justified belief is a 
case of believing something for a reason. In the non-inferential cases, there’s nothing 
that could have been your reason for believing what you do.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Other interesting and important test cases are cases of knowledge of your own 
intention and action and knowledge of the position of your own limbs. See Anscombe's 
(1962) and (2000) discussions of the possibility of knowledge without clues. Some 
writers like Audi (2001) could try to do justice to Anscombe's observations by 
suggesting that it is possible to know p without believing p for any sort of reason while 
insisting that it is not possible to justifiably believe p without the support of such 
reasons. My main concern with this strategy is precisely that it suggests that the 
relevant cases are cases of knowledge in which the subject's belief is not justified. If the 
subject's belief is indeed knowledge, I do not think that it would lack the kind of 
positive normative standing that we call 'justification'. On most views, if you do not 
justifiably believe p, you should not believe p. I don't think it makes much sense to 
concede that someone knows p only then to insist that they shouldn't believe it. (And if 
you want to cut the link between unjustified beliefs and beliefs that you shouldn't hold, 
you have to do considerable work explaining why your concept of justification is an 
interesting one. It doesn't appear to coincide with any natural, interesting normative 
standing.) 
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 There is an important lesson to take from this.  We see knowledge, justification, 
and rationality as positive standings.  The standard view sees that standing as arising 
because some target beliefs are supported by reasons. Their aspiration seems to be to 
offer a kind of grounding thesis, one that says that status arises when it does because 
certain beliefs receive the right support from reasons. They think it would be a mistake 
to run things the other direction. Trying to account for reasons and their possession in 
terms of some status would defeat any attempt to ground epistemic status or reduce it 
to something else. Unfortunately, this will not work. The statuses we’re interested in 
(i.e., knowledge and justification) cannot be understood in terms of the possession of 
reasons and some basing condition because possession is understood in terms of 
knowledge. The primary basis problem is a vivid illustration of the standard view's 
fatal flaw. It wants to put reasons to work but has no good story about how we acquire 
these reasons.26  
  
3.2 The Secondary Basis Problem 
The primary basis problem arises when we try to give an adequate account of the 
rational support a belief must have to be a justified belief. When we think about the 
constraints imposed by the standard view, we see that the case of non-inferential belief 
is problematic. By virtue of being non-inferential, cases in which you believe 
something non-inferentially are not cases in which there is something that is your 
reason for believing what you do. Thus, the standard view is at odds with the non-
skeptical assumption that we have some immediately justified beliefs. In this section, I 
shall introduce a secondary basis problem. This problem has to do not with the basis a 
belief has to receive in order to be justified but with the basis that we expect a belief to 
provide if it is justified. 
 If your belief in p is justified, this has important implications for further actions 
and attitudes. If you justifiably believe p, you have propositional justification to believe 
at least some of p's obvious consequences.  This is what weak closure principles tell us. 
If a belief is justified, the standard view assures us that it is justified because it rests on 
a sufficient evidential basis that provides it with its propositional justification and it can 
provide a basis for further belief. For this further belief to be justified, it too has to 
receive support from the evidence. 
  What has to happen for someone to V for the reason that p? Among other 
things she has to V, p has to be true, and she has to take p to be both true and 
something that favors V-ing.  These conditions are necessary but they are not 
sufficient. The connection between the fact that p and the belief in p might be purely 
accidental.  Consider a modified experience machine. In the standard telling, there is a 
radical gap between appearance and reality because reality does not match the 
appearances. Trapped in the machine and falsely believing yourself to be living your 
normal life, it might appear to you that your sister is graduating and a smile might 
stretch across your face, but you aren't happy that your sister is graduating. You are 
happy because you think she is graduating. In the standard telling, she is not 
graduating. Maybe she dropped out. Maybe she has hit by a bus. Maybe she won the 
lottery. Maybe she already graduated, had a long and fulfilling career, and has retired. 
Because we know how to construct Gettier cases we can tell a version of the story in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The story doesn't get better if you modify the standard view so that it includes 
mistaken claims about the ontology of reasons.  
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which your sister happens to graduate just as you come to believe she is. Maybe you 
have the experience as of reading about her graduation in an email and it just so 
happens that she graduated and her graduation went just as described. In this state, 
you are still completely detached from reality. In this state, you might luck into the odd 
true belief about events outside the machine, but your reason for smiling will not be 
that your sister graduated. That's a part of reality that you are completely cut off from, 
so such realities cannot be what rationally guides you. To V for the reason that p, you 
have to be in touch with the part of reality that consists of facts. This requires 
knowledge.  Only a belief that constitutes knowledge is up to this task of providing 
reasons for further beliefs.27   
 If we put these two ideas together, we see that the standard view is committed 
to something troubling.  A belief is justified if it receives sufficient support from the 
evidence. Suppose a belief has that support. Such a belief should in turn provide 
sufficient support that justifies further belief. The standard view assures us that this 
happens because the belief provides evidential support for these further beliefs.  
Suppose your belief in p is inferential and you have forgotten your original grounds. 
Suppose your belief in p is justified. If it justifies any further belief, this further belief in 
q, say, is justified because it is supported by the facts that constitute your reason for 
believing this further proposition. Since you don't remember the original grounds for 
believing p, the only candidate for being the reason for which you believe q is p.  Note 
two things. First, if someone else came to believe p mistakenly and forgot their original 
grounds, p could not be both false and capable of justifying further beliefs. It would not 
link these further beliefs to evidence that consists of facts. Thus, it seems that the 
present development of the standard view does not allow for any justified, false 
belief.28  Second, if the belief in p is justified only if it is possible to V for the reason that 
p, it seems that the belief also has to be knowledge. Now it emerges that the standard 
view is committed to the rather unfortunate idea that among the conditions for 
justifiably believing p is that you believe p for reasons that guarantee that you know p. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This kind of accidental connection case is trouble for accurate attitude accounts of 
evidence possession of the kind we find in Hofmann (2014), Mitova (2015), and 
Schroeder (2008, 2015). For views on which possessed evidence involves a non-
accidental connection between the belief and the fact, see Hyman (1999), Littlejohn 
(2012), Mantel (2013), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000). 
28 Bird (2007) and Williamson (2000) initially wanted non-factive accounts of justified 
belief on which a subject's evidence consists of what she knows, but this puts some 
pressure on Bird to choose between the standard view and a more radical account of 
justified belief of the sort that McDowell and Williamson now accept. The observation 
that propositional stored in memory should count as propositional evidence is one I 
owe to Bird's (2004) dicsussion of inferential evidence. In Littlejohn (2012) I argued that 
there could not be false, justified beliefs about what to do or believe. Similar 
arguments can be found in Gibbons (2013), Greco (2014), and Way and Whiting 
(forthcoming).  These authors seem to think that this holds only in special cases, but in 
my (2012) argument against justified, false beliefs I pointed out that you can use closure 
principles to extend the point to non-normative beliefs. Once you agree that there 
cannot be false, justified beliefs about certain normative matters, it will be hard to 
constrain this to avoid the conclusion that beliefs about non-normative matters have to 
be true to be justified, too.      
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 Once we have this picture of what it takes for a belief to provide the proper 
basis for the attitudes the belief rationalizes, we can see that the standard view faces a 
kind of skeptical problem:  
A Skeptical Argument 
1. If you justifiably believe p, you believe p and you believe 
p for reasons that consist of pieces of evidence that 
provide strong enough support for this belief. [The 
Dependence Thesis] 
2. Your reasons for believing p provide strong enough 
support for this belief only it is not possible to believe on 
the basis of these reasons and fail to conform to the 
norm(s) governing belief (i.e., the fact that you believe for 
these reasons entails that you conform to the norm(s) 
governing belief).   
3. So, if you justifiably believe p, the fact that you believe 
for the reasons that you actually do entails that you 
conform to the norm(s) governing belief.  
4. Knowledge is the norm of belief.29 
5. So, if you justifiably believe p, the fact that you believe 
for the reasons that you actually do entails that you know 
p. 
6. In cases of inductive inference the fact that you believe 
p for the reasons that you actually do does not entail that 
you know p. 
7. So, cases of inductive inference are not cases of justified 
belief.  
This skeptical conclusion is one best avoided. Luckily, it is easily avoided.   
 Someone could contest (2) but I think this premise is innocuous. Remember 
that the standard view tells us that the subject's evidence completely settles whether 
there is propositional justification for her belief. When the subject has this justification 
for believing p, it is not the case that she should refrain from believing p. That is to say, 
she conforms to the norms that govern belief.30 
 Because they treat (2) as all but axiomatic, traditional internalists will see this 
argument as a reason to reject the idea that knowledge is the norm of belief. This 
would be wrongheaded. You cannot settle questions about the point or purpose of 
belief by thinking about the kinds of reasons we could have for these beliefs (e.g., 
observations of past events) and the kinds of support these reasons provide (e.g., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For defenses of this premise, see Littlejohn (2013), Sutton (2007), and Williamson 
(2000). These authors along with McDowell agree that a belief is justified iff it 
constitutes knowledge. 
30 Bird (2007) suggests that justification might require something less than norm 
conformity. Bird is not alone in suggesting that there is something attractive about a 
view that combines the knowledge norm of belief with an account of justification that 
allows for justified beliefs that don't constitute knowledge.  See also Miracchi (2015) 
and Smithies (2011).  For arguments against accounts of justification according to which 
justification requires something less than conforming to norms, see Littlejohn (2012, 
2013). In my view, these authors are conflating excuses with justifications. 
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fallible and defeasible support). You cannot settle questions about the norm of belief 
without taking a position on the point or purpose of belief.  While the skeptic is 
mistaken in denying us knowledge and justification, we cannot show that this skeptical 
argument is mistaken simply by observing that our reasons for certain beliefs (e.g., 
beliefs formed by means of inductive inference) could never be good enough to ensure 
that these beliefs constituted knowledge in the sense required by the combination of 
(2) and (3). We cannot argue from the premise that our grounds are weak to the 
conclusion that our aim was never to know in the first place. 
 We should also now see why a proponent of the standard view is in no position 
to (4).  If you believe p, you can only V for the reason that p if your belief constitutes 
knowledge. We saw above that if you combine this claim about ability with a closure 
principle and an observation about the persistence of justification after a subject loses 
her original grounds for forming a belief a proponent of the standard view has to say 
that a belief is justified only if it is knowledge. A belief is justified, recall, only if it can 
enable the subject to V for a reason and only beliefs that constitute knowledge provide 
that guarantee.  When the original grounds are lost, the only thing it could provide as a 
reason is the fact that the belief concerns. 
 As with the primary basis problem, the obvious solution to the secondary basis 
problem is the rejection of the Dependence Thesis.  If you can know p even when there 
is nothing that is your reason for believing p the ability to be guided by a reason that is 
the fact that p is not an ability you acquire only by forming a belief in response to 
evidence that you held independently. Once we see this, we can see that we also have 
to reject the Sufficiency Thesis. Suppose a subject can justifiably believe p without that 
belief being based on evidence (e.g., in the perceptual case, in the proprioception case, 
in the introspection case, etc.). A subject that similarly had no evidence that supported 
p might come to believe p and fail to know p. This second subject's belief in p would not 
provide her with a potential motivating reason that could be her reason for V-ing.  
Thus, it is a mistake to think that the evidence that these subjects shared in common 
prior to coming to believe p determined whether they had sufficient justification to 
believe p because only one of them did.   
 Once we see this possibility, we can see that propositional justification does not 
supervene upon the subject's evidence. In turn, this helps us to avoid three mistaken 
responses to the argument just sketched. The standard view forces us to choose 
between three unpalatable options concerning inductive inference. In reasoning from 
past observations to a conclusion some unobserved it seems that two subjects might 
draw the same conclusion for the very same reasons and for only one of these subjects 
to end up with a true belief. The proponent of the standard view is either forced to say 
one of these three things:  
(a) Contrary to how things might seem, these subjects' 
reasons for drawing their conclusions differed. The 
subject that formed a true belief had better reasons for 
drawing her conclusion than the subject that formed the 
false belief had. 
(b) These subjects' reasons for drawing their conclusions 
did not differ but the subject that formed the true belief 
could only justifiably form that belief if her reasons for 
forming that belief differed from the subject in the bad 
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case. Thus, neither ends up with a justified belief or 
knowledge. 
(c) These subjects' reasons for drawing their conclusions 
did not differ but they were good enough reasons to 
justify both sets of beliefs. 
Each response is problematic and we are only forced to choose amongst these options 
if we retain the Sufficiency Thesis. If we reject it, we can say the same thing for the case 
of inductive inference that we said for the case of non-inferential knowledge. When 
the subject is led to form a belief that constitutes knowledge, she had propositional 
justification for that belief precisely because she was in a position to know it. That she 
was in such a position does not supervene upon her possessed evidence, so the 
possessed evidence does not constitute the supervenience base for propositional 
justification. 
  
4. The Path Principle 
Proponents of the standard view are locked in a bad debate.  Most of the proponents of 
the standard view (e.g., traditional internalists like Conee and Feldman or factualists 
about reasons who think that a belief could be justified without constituting 
knowledge) will argue that knowledge couldn’t be the norm of belief (or that justified 
beliefs cannot be understood as beliefs that conform to epistemic norms) because they 
think, quite plausibly, that our potential reasons for belief almost never ensure that we 
are in a position to know.  Since we know a great deal, they mistakenly conclude from 
this that justification or norm conformity requires something less than knowledge.  
Their opponents (e.g., McDowell and possibly Pritchard) will insist that knowledge is 
the norm of belief and insist that we can meet this norm.  Because of this they will try 
to show that meeting this norm involves, inter alia, being moved by reasons so potent 
that it would be impossible for someone to be moved by these reasons and fail to end 
up 'in the know'.  
 People get trapped in this debate because they accept something like this 
principle:  
The Path Principle:  Facts about propositional justification are 
grounded in facts about the evidence you have and the 
independently specifiable support relations they stand in to the 
propositions you grasp.  Whenever it would be appropriate for 
you to add a belief to your current belief set, this is because 
there is a path from your current belief set to your expanded set 
that is provided by your evidence. The path is available to 
anyone with your total evidence. For each justified belief you 
add, there would have had been such a path open to you that 
you followed. 
Suppose we combine this idea with the further idea that knowledge is the norm of 
belief. The upshot would be that it would be appropriate to add p to your belief set 
only if the path you followed would lead anyone to knowledge if they followed the 
path equally competently.  Since there would be no path like this for our perceptual 
beliefs unless something like epistemological disjunctivism were true, it is easy to see 
why McDowell and Pritchard are attracted to that view.  Since there is no path like this 
that takes us from the premises of an inductive argument to its conclusion, it is easy to 
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see fans of more traditional internalist views reject the idea that a belief has to 
constitute knowledge to be justified.   
  We don't have to choose between these options. The case of perceptual belief is 
just the case that shows that there's something wrong with the Path Principle.  Suppose 
that at noon I'm opening the door to my flat and I wonder where Agnes is. My evidence 
does not distinguish between two hypotheses:  
H1: She is sitting by the door. 
H2: She is standing on the table watching the squirrels 
through the window. 
If I see her seated by the door, I could come to know that that's where she is. If, 
however, I saw her standing on the table, I could come to know that that's where she is.  
There is no path from the evidence I had before opening the door that led to one belief 
as opposed to the other. There is no evidential path after I open the door to one belief 
as opposed to another. My evidence only favors H1 over H2 as a result of coming to 
know H1.31 Perceptual knowledge gives us our counterexamples to the Path Principle. 
 Another troubling test case for the Path Principle comes from cases of 
knowledge from false belief. If Tina's parents tell her that Santa will bring her presents, 
she might deduce from this that there will be presents waiting for her on Christmas 
morning. Tina might have only believed there would be presents because she thought 
that Santa would bring them. Tina might be fully aware of her parents' desperate 
financial situation. If Tina's parents would only tell her that Santa would bring 
presents if they had safely secured them beforehand, this looks like a good case of 
knowledge from non-knowledge.32 There would be nothing that would be Tina's 
reason for believing that she will receive presents on Christmas morning, but this 
belief is nevertheless justified. The Path Principle struggles with such cases because it 
either rules out too much (e.g., beliefs that constitute knowledge) or rules out too little 
(e.g., falsehoods that Tina could deduce from the premise that Santa is going to bring 
presents). Any path to knowledge is a path that is good enough, but Tina should reason 
to the conclusion that there will be presents but should not reason to the conclusion 
that her friends are mistaken if they say that Santa is a myth. 
 We can start to see why we should resist the temptation to accept the Path 
Principle if we think about its practical analogue.  What would the practical analogues 
of the Dependence Thesis and Sufficiency Thesis look like?  The analogue of the 
Dependence Thesis is that you have justification to act is only because there are 
reasons that could be your reasons for acting that provide strong support for so acting.  
The analogue of Sufficiency Thesis is that the justification of your action is settled by 
the support your reasons for acting provide.  Cases in which you act without acting for 
any reason pose a serious problem for both claims.  You might doodle intentionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This is Williamson's Kierkegaardian leap. This is where McDowell and Williamson 
part company and I think this is precisely where the virtues of Williamson's view are 
most evident. Brown (2013), however, raises some interesting concerns about 
Williamson's view, focusing on the issue of whether a piece of evidence might be 
evidence for itself.  
32 See Klein (2004) for a discussion of knowledge from falsehood cases and Luzzi (2010) 
for a discussion of their significance for closure and counter-closure principles. In 
Littlejohn (forthcoming) I argue that the cases that cause trouble for knowledge 
counter-closure can also be used to cause trouble for justification counter-closure.   
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and in full knowledge that you are doodling when there is nothing that is your reason 
for doodling. By your lights, there is nothing that counts in favor of doodling. Suppose 
you’re right. Does it follow that your action isn’t justified?  No. If you permissibly 
doodle, your doodling must be justified. If it’s not justified, however, you shouldn’t 
doodle. If you shouldn’t doodle, there would be a decisive reason for you not to doodle. 
There isn’t one. At least, there needn’t be one given the sketchy details of the case.  
(Remember that ‘ought’ implies ‘reason’. Whenever you ought to refrain from doing 
something, there is at least some reason to refrain. And whenever you ought to do 
something, there is at least some reason to do it.)   
 
5. Reasons For, Reasons Against, Liability and Justification 
In defending the standard view, its defenders seem to think that the relationship 
between reasons and justification should be understood as follows. Support from 
potential motivating reasons or evidence determines whether there is justification to 
believe p and the belief is justified if the subject is moved to believe for these reasons.  
All the reasons that determine whether a belief is justified will be pieces of evidence, 
things that could move the subject to believe something. 
 The standard view misses something important. It focuses too much on the role 
that reasons play in moving you to believe and ignores the role that reasons against 
play in determining justificatory standing.  Think back to the perceptual case before, 
the case in which I initially had evidence that supported H1 and H2 equally but then 
came to know H1 by opening the door and seeing where Agnes was.  The Path 
Principle would tell us that if your evidence supports two incompatible propositions 
equally well there would either be no clear path to either one or a clear path to either 
one. But it is clear that it would be appropriate to believe H1 and inappropriate to 
believe H2. While the evidence that supports H1 and H2 does not distinguish between 
them the reasons that bear on whether to believe H1 and H2 clearly differ. There is a 
decisive reason not to believe H2 and there is no reason not to believe H1. This is why I 
could justifiably believe H1 and could not justifiably believe H2. 
 With this much in place, we have the resources to show that the Identity Thesis 
is false. Let's say that there's a norm that governs belief, one that says that you 
shouldn't believe p unless some condition obtains. Should and ought imply reason. 
Let's call the reasons associated with norms 'norm reasons' and let's call pieces of 
evidence 'evidential reasons'. The standard view seems to be that insofar as norm 
reasons bear on the justificatory status of belief they either are pieces of evidence or 
they at least supervene upon the evidence. The perceptual case shows that this is not 
the case:  
An Argument Against the Identity Thesis 
1. If the Identity Thesis is correct, norm reasons just are 
evidential reasons and thus norm reasons supervene 
upon evidential reasons (i.e., no difference in norm 
reasons without an evidential difference).  
2. In cases of justified perceptual belief, however, pairs of 
subjects with the very same evidential reasons can differ 
in terms of the norm reasons that bear on whether these 
subjects should believe certain propositions. 
C. Thus, the Identity Thesis is mistaken and the set of 
reasons that bears on whether to believe and determines 
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what the subject has justification to believe must be 
distinct from the set of evidential reasons. 
Even if the standard view were correct, we could distinguish evidential reasons from 
norm reasons. If a subject believed p without sufficient evidence, she should not 
believe p. Since ought implies reason, there would be a norm reason in light of which 
she should not believe p. This reason, however, would not be an evidential reason.33  
Proponents of the standard view might think that they would have little reason to 
bother distinguishing these kinds of reasons because they would have to say (given the 
Sufficient Thesis) that all norm reasons supervene upon evidential reasons, but once 
we see that this supervenience thesis is mistaken, we can see why we must reject the 
Identity Thesis. It is only when we reject the Identity Thesis that we see why the Path 
Principle is mistaken.   
 The Path Principle tells us that the presence of a path has all to do with the kind 
of support provided by evidential reasons.  This is mistake. If there is an appropriate 
route from your present set of beliefs to an expanded set, this has to do with norm 
reasons: there is an appropriate route iff there is no norm reason not to expand your 
belief set this way. Of course, one possible reason why there might be a norm reason 
not to expand your belief set might be that you do not have the right kind of evidence, 
but the absence of evidence is (a) only one potential reason why a path might be closed 
and (b) no guarantee that a path is closed.   
 If we want to state a theory of justification that captures the relation between 
reasons and justification, it should look something like this.  A belief will be justified iff 
there is no norm reason not to hold that belief. Put differently, a belief will be justified 
if the subject who holds it conforms to the norms that govern belief. This is a purely 
formal claim about the relationship between reasons, justification, and norms.  If we 
wanted to state something substantive about justification, we would need to identify 
the norms that govern belief.   
 I would suggest that the norm that governs belief is the knowledge norm, one 
that says that you should not believe what you do not know. If we combine this with 
the formal account of justification just sketched, we get the result that a belief is 
justified iff that belief constitutes knowledge. If it does not, there is a decisive reason 
not to hold that belief. If it does or would, there is no reason not to form or hold that 
belief.    
 The reader might wonder why we should think knowledge is the norm of 
belief.  In discussions of epistemic value and of the aim of belief, people often say that 
true beliefs are a kind of fundamental epistemic good and that truth is the aim of 
belief.  I think that there's a kernel of truth here. Beliefs are supposed to give us reasons 
that we can then use as guides. Specifically, they are supposed to give us potential 
motivating reasons, reasons that could be our reasons for believing things, feeling 
things, or doing things.  Beliefs are supposed to put us in touch with the facts so that 
they can guide our thoughts, feelings, and actions. Because reasons are truths, only 
true beliefs can do what beliefs are supposed to do. This is why some true beliefs are 
good and why belief aims at the truth. As we've seen, though, only beliefs that 
constitute knowledge can give us these potential motivating reasons. When the 
connection between belief and fact is accidental, we cannot be guided by this fact in 
our beliefs, feelings, or actions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A point I owe to Owens (2000). 
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 If we think about this link between belief and reason, we can rethink the 
relationship between reasons and status. It seems that one way of describing the 
fundamental norm of belief is as follows:  
RN: You shouldn't believe p unless your belief in p 
ensures that p is among your potential motivating reasons 
for believing, feeling, and doing things.  
If any belief you hold does not conform to this norm, there is a decisive reason not to 
hold that belief. Nothing could be said for it because the belief could not do the one 
thing it is supposed to do. Thus, this link between belief and reason suggests that there 
is a kind of liability that comes with belief. Whenever you form a belief, you are liable 
to violate a norm simply by virtue of forming a belief that couldn't enable you to 
believe, feel, or do things in light of how the belief presents things as being.  
 When we test candidate accounts of what it takes for a belief to conform to this 
norm, we can see that some standard proposals don't look very promising.  If you think 
that strong evidential support is sufficient for conforming to whatever norm governs 
belief, this evidential norm (EN) combined with RN implies that if you believe p on the 
basis of sufficiently strong evidence, you'll be able to believe, feel, or do things for the 
reason that p. This, in turn, leads to an implausibly strong requirement on what 
sufficient evidential support comes to or an implausibly weak requirement on what it 
takes for you to be guided by facts. Since on most views of sufficient evidential support 
you can have sufficient evidential support for false beliefs, EN combined with RN 
suggests that you could be guided by facts that aren't facts.  
 If you combine RN with a standard formulation of TN according to which any 
true belief fulfills the aim of belief, we get the odd result that any true belief can ensure 
that you'll be guided by the facts (i.e., a view on which you can be guided by facts that 
are not facts). If we think about Gettiered versions of Nozick's experience machine, 
though, it seems it shouldn't too hard to think up cases in which an accurate belief isn't 
sufficient to put you in touch with reality. Since it doesn't put you in touch with reality, 
it doesn't enable you to be guided by reality. If it doesn't do that, the belief should 
violate RN in spite of conforming to TN. To my mind, this is a good reason to think that 
TN is not the fundamental norm of belief.34 
  
6. Evidence, Reasons, and Epistemic Supervenience 
Let’s consider two supervenience theses:  
JSE: Justification supervenes upon the subject’s evidence. 
JSR: Justification supervenes upon the reasons that bear on 
whether the subject should believe.    
Just as in ethics, we tend to think that like cases should be treated alike and that there 
might well be principles that identify the morally significant features of situations that 
tell us what to do we might think that in epistemology like cases should be treated 
alike and that there might be principles or norms that identify the epistemically 
significant features of situations that tell us what to believe. If we buy into this way of 
thinking and we accept these supervenience theses, they tell us how we should think of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Although some proponents of TN have tried to show that justification requires more 
than mere truth on the grounds that the norms require more than mere conformity. 
See Whiting (2013) for discussion and Littlejohn (2013) for arguments that TN does not 
require enough. 
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situations. Situations would have to be individuated in such a way that any difference 
in epistemically relevant features would be traced to some difference or differences in 
the evidence possessed by the subjects in these situations.  Just as the reasons that bear 
on what to do tell us how to handle a situation and aren't affected by things not 
morally relevant to a situation, the reasons that bear on what to believe and tell us how 
to handle a situation and aren't affected by things not epistemically relevant to that 
situation. According to JSE, the factors that aren't relevant to epistemic situations are 
those that don't supervene upon a subject's evidence. 
 Once we see why the Identity Thesis is false, we can see why JSE must also be 
mistaken. It is trivial that JSR holds. We have already seen that pairs of subjects with 
the very same evidence might have different norm reasons that apply to them. So, 
situations should not be individuated in terms of the subject's evidence but in terms of 
what the subject knows or is in a position to know.  
   
7. Conclusion 
The standard view is mistaken about two things.  It conflates reasons and evidence and 
is wrong about the rational roles that they play. It is trivial that the reasons that bear on 
whether to believe, feel, or do something determine what can be justified, but it is a 
mistake to conclude from this that an individual's evidence entirely settles whether she 
could be justified in believing something. The reasons that determine whether we can 
believe with justification are provided by epistemic norms, not our evidence, and these 
norms determine how and the extent to which an individual's evidence matters in 
epistemic evaluation.  We can now better see the limits of evidence in our theories of 
justification and knowledge.   
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